It may be true that taking all causes one with another
Again, on the subject of juries, or other tribunals, some mathematicians have set out from the proposition that the judgment of any one judge, or juryman, is, at least in some small degree, more likely to be right than wrong, and have concluded that the chance of a number of persons concurring in a wrong verdict is diminished, the more the number is increased; so that if the judges are only made sufficiently numerous, the correctness of the judgment may be reduced almost to certainty. I say nothing of the disregard shown to the effect produced on the moral position of the judges by multiplying their numbers; the virtual destruction of their individual responsibility, and weakening of the application of their minds to the subject. I remark only the fallacy of reasoning from a wide average, to cases necessarily differing greatly from any average. It may be true that taking all causes one with another, the opinion of any one of the judges would be oftener right than wrong; but the argument forgets that in all but cheap oakley sunglasses
the more simple cases, in all cases in which it is really of much consequence what the tribunal is, the proposition might probably be reversed; besides which, the cause of error, whether arising from the intricacy of the case or from some common prejudice or mental infirmity, if it cheap oakleys
acted upon one judge, would be extremely likely to affect all the others in the same manner, or at least a majority, and thus render a wrong instead of a right decision more probable, the more the number was increased. These are but samples of the errors frequently committed by men who, having made themselves familiar with the difficult formulae which algebra affords for the estimation of oakley outlet
chances under suppositions of a complex character, like better to employ those formulae in computing what are the probabilities to a person half informed about a case, than to look out for means of being better informed.